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1

Introduction

The Bush Administration has argued that a Kyoto type agreement will not
achieve much unless it covers almost all countries in the world. Instead, it
has proposed support for R&D directed towards lowering costs of alternative energy sources. However, there are many reasons why such a focus on
technology development as an alternative to policies and agreements focusing
directly on emissions will not give signi…cant reductions of greenhouse gas
emissions. The present paper discusses one such reason: When the supply
side of fossil fuels is taken into consideration, fossil fuel prices may decline
as a consequence of improved renewable energy technology.
The most important contribution to the climate problem is CO2 from
the combustion of fossil fuels. The climate problem is thus to a large extent caused by extracting carbon resources and transferring them to the atmosphere. Logically, any discussion of the climate problem therefore ought
to be intimately linked to a discussion of the extraction of carbon resources.
In spite of this obvious fact, surprising little of the literature makes this link.
However, there are important exceptions. Early contributions making this
link include Sinclair (1992), Ulph and Ulph (1994) and Withagen (1994).
However, most of this literature and more recent literature makes this link in
the context of discussing optimal climate policies1 , in spite of the fact that
a broad and globally cost-e¤ective international climate agreement seems to
be unlikely in the near future. There is little work making the link between
climate policies and exhaustible resources when policies are non-optimal or
international agreements are incomplete. Again, there are exceptions: Peter
Bohm (1994) was probably the …rst to point out carbon leakage e¤ects via
the carbon resource market when only a subset of countries participate in
a climate agreement. A similar issue is treated by Hoel (1994), but only
within a static framework. Sinn (2008) has recently shown that when the
1

See e.g Hoel and Kverndokk (1996), Tahvonen (1997), Chakravorty et al. (2006).
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exhaustibility of carbon is taken into consideration, climate policies that are
not optimally designed may increase emissions instead of reducing them.
Finally, while various e¤ects of technology change have recently been discussed in the context of climate policy, most of this literature ignores the
fact that such technology change may have consequences for the supply of
carbon. An exception is Strand (2007), who shows that a technology agreement that will make carbon redundant in the future may increase present
carbon emissions. The present paper makes a less drastic assumption about
technology improvement: Although technology improvement will lower the
costs of renewable energy, carbon resources will still have lower costs than
the substitute. The consequences of such a technology improvement are analyzed for a situation where di¤erent countries (or groups of countries) have
climate policies of di¤ering ambition levels, but where there does not exist an
e¢ cient global climate agreement. An important insight from this analysis is
that climate costs may increase as a consequence of the improved technology
of renewable energy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 it is shown that
even if a given amount of carbon is eventually extracted, the time pro…le
of the carbon extraction is important from a climate point of view. Any
postponement in extraction is likely to lower climate costs, even if total
emissions over time are given by the available carbon resources.
The model for the market of fossil fuels is presented in Section 3. On the
supply side, there is a given and known stock of carbon resources (fossil fuels)
that are supplied competitively. Moreover, there exists a perfect substitute
for fossil fuels, with a constant unit cost and supplied competitively. On the
demand side, each country is assumed to have some willingness to pay (WTP)
for reducing carbon emissions, and each country sets a carbon tax equal to
its WTP. (Alternatively, each country could have a domestic quota system
giving a quota price equal to its WTP.) There will thus be a distribution
of carbon taxes (or quota prices) across countries. This substitute will be

3

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper262

2

Hoel: Bush Meets Hotelling: Effects of Improved Renewable Energy T

adopted by countries for which the fuel price plus the carbon tax exceeds the
cost of producing the substitute. However, in countries that have a lower
WTP the fuel price including the carbon tax will be lower than the cost
of the substitute, and these countries will not adopt the substitute. These
properties of the demand side are used to determine the market equilibrium
for carbon extraction.
Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of an improvement of the technology for
producing the substitute, thus lowering its cost. If the fossil fuel price were
una¤ected, this cost reduction would induce some countries to switch from
fossil fuels to the substitute, so that global carbon emissions would decline.
However, fossil fuels are non-renewable, and the competitive supply gives a
price path of the fuel which depends both on present and future demand.
When this “Hotelling feature” is taken into consideration, the whole price
path of the carbon resource will shift downwards as a response to the reduced cost of the substitute. An implication of this, in combination with
the absence of an e¢ cient climate agreement, is that it is no longer obvious
that greenhouse gas emissions decline in the near future. I show that carbon
emissions are more likely to increase in the near future the higher is the elasticity of demand for the sum of carbon resource and the substitute and the
scarcer the carbon resource is.
In a …rst-best social optimum, reduced costs of a substitute will always
increase overall welfare. The welfare of fossil fuel suppliers will go down,
but the increased welfare of all others will be larger than the welfare loss of
the fuel suppliers. Section 4 demonstrates that without an e¢ cient climate
agreement, climate costs may increase so much that overall social welfare
declines as a consequence of reduced costs of a substitute.
Section 5 shows that the results from Section 4 remain valid under the
important extensions of the substitute being imperfect and extraction costs
rising with accumulated extraction.
Section 6 concludes: An important policy implication is that technolog-
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ical improvement in the production of renewable energy cannot in itself be
trusted as a good mechanism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. While
technology improvement may be an important feature of international climate cooperation, it is important that this cooperation also focuses directly
on emission reductions.

2

Climate costs and carbon resource extraction

In the subsequent analysis, it is assumed that the total amount of carbon resources are given, and that all of this carbon will eventually be extracted and
thus emitted into the atmosphere.2 Total emissions over all future years are
thus given. In spite of this, the pro…le of the carbon extraction is important
from a climate point of view. A rapid increase of carbon in the atmosphere
will gradually decline over time, as it is transferred to other sinks. However,
a signi…cant portion (about 25% according to e.g. Archer, 2005) remains in
the atmosphere for ever (or at least for thousands of years). Thus if a …xed
amount of carbon, denoted C0 ; is extracted over any time period, this will
give a long-run increase of about C0 =4 in the atmosphere. With a su¢ ciently
slow rate of carbon extraction, carbon in the atmosphere will grow gradually
and monotonically until its long-run level S is reached (asymptotically if
carbon extraction declines asymptotically towards zero). This is illustrated
by curve A in Figure 1, where S(0) is the amount of carbon in the atmosphere
at our initial date 0 (so S
S(0) + C0 =4). Clearly, such a development of
carbon in the atmosphere will be associated with a gradually changing climate. With a higher rate of extraction, the carbon in the atmosphere will
increase more rapidly, and will overshoot its long-run value S , as curve B
in Figure 1. This will give a considerably faster climate change, probably
2

The implications of relaxing this assumption are discussed in Section 5.2.
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with temperatures above the slow extraction path for several centuries. One
can argue strongly that the climate costs associated with the rapid extraction path are much higher than the climate costs associated with the climate
development associated with the slow extraction path, even if discounting is
ignored. This seems particularly likely if some e¤ects of climate changes are
irreversible, and if the speed of climate change is also an important consideration.3 Appendix I gives a formal treatment of the e¤ects of postponing
emissions under the frequently used assumption that climate costs at any
time depend only on the stock of carbon in the atmosphere via its a¤ect on
the state of the climate. The climate cost at time + `, where ` is an exogenous time lag, is given as a function of the stock of carbon in the atmosphere
at , denoted D(S( )). In Appendix I it is shown that a su¢ cient condition
for climate costs to decline if emissions are postponed from t to a later date
is that
max

r+
D0 (S( ))
<
0
D (S(t))
(1
)

(1)

for all > t. In (1) is the share of carbon that remains in the atmosphere
for ever, and is the depreciation rate of the remaining share of carbon (see
Appendix I for details). Condition (1) is more likely to hold the larger is
the interest rate r. Consider therefore the case of a relatively small interest
rate, r = 0:02. Moreover, let = 0:25 and = 0:013 (cf. Appendix I). For
these values the r.h.s. of (1) is 3.4. If D0 (S( )) along the initial emission
path never exceeds 3.4 D0 (S(t)), climate costs are therefore always reduced
by a postponement in emissions. If e.g. D(S) = bS 2 , this means that S( ) <
1:8 S(t) for all > t is a su¢ cient condition for climate costs to decline as
emissions are postponed. If we had r = 0:03 instead of r = 0:02, the condition
would instead be D0 (S( )) < 4:4 D0 (S(t)), which with D(S) = bS 2 would
imply S( ) < 2:1 S(t) for all > t. While these numbers suggest that the
3

Tahvonen (1995), Hoel and Isaksen (1995), and Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) explicitly
consider the speed of climate change in their analyses.
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su¢ cient condition (1) is likely to hold, it is not obvious that this is the case.
However, the details in Appendix I suggest that a postponement of emissions
may reduce climate costs even if this su¢ cient condition does not hold. In
the subsequent sections I therefore assume that a postponement of emissions
reduces climate costs.

3

The market for fossil fuels

The market for fossil fuels is modeled as a market for a homogeneous nonrenewable carbon resource, given in …xed supply and with no extraction
costs. The resource is supplied by competitive owners of the resource, and
the equilibrium producer price p(t) therefore rises at the interest rate r as
long as there are any remaining reserves.
The demand for carbon is given as the sum of demand from several countries. There is a perfect substitute for the carbon resource, supplied competitively at its unit cost b. Countries have identical gross utility functions
depending on the sum of the use of carbon and the substitute, u(x+y), where
x and y are the use of carbon and the substitute, respectively.4 If there were
no environmental considerations, each country would therefore choose its x
and y to maximize u(x + y) px by, subject to non-negativity constraints.
However, countries have a WTP for reducing x that is equal to w per unit of
x. This WTP may be equal to the marginal climate cost of the country, but
it may also contain some elements of altruism so that the country has a WTP
that exceeds the direct damage of its own emissions on itself. It is probably
di¢ cult to explain the relative high WTP of some European countries unless
such an altruistic element is included.
4

Introducing di¤erences in the u-functions across countries would complicate notation
without changing any results.
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Given a WTP equal to w per unit of emissions, the choice of x and y for
a country maximizes u(x + y) px wx by, implying that if p > b w, the
country uses only the substitute and not the carbon resource. If p < b w;
x = D(p + w), where D( )
(u0 ) 1 ( ): The value of w is assumed to vary
across countries.5 This variation is modeled by a distribution function F (w)
over [0; W ], giving us the proportion of countries that have WTP for reduced
carbon use that does not exceed w. F (b p) is therefore the proportion of
that countries that use the carbon resource, while the proportion 1 F (b p)
use the substitute. Notice that if F (b) < 1, some countries will not use the
carbon resource no matter how low its price p is.
Normalizing the size of countries so their total mass is one, the aggregate
demand for carbon is given by
X=

Z

b p

D(p + w)dF (w) = X(p; b)

(2)

0

Straightforward derivations reveille that
Xb (p; b) = D(b)F 0 (b

p)

(3)

and
Xp (p; b) =

Xb (p; b) +

Z

b p

D0 (p + w)dF (w)

(4)

0

Since F 0 is non-negative, Xb must also be non-negative, and strictly positive if F 0 > 0. The second term in (4) is negative since D0 < 0, implying that
Xp < 0. The aggregate demand function for carbon thus has the standard
property that it is downward sloping as a function of the price. Moreover,
this demand function will shift inwards if the cost of producing the substitute
is reduced (unless F 0 = 0).
5

Instead of the interpretation above of w, we could simply interpret w as an a carbon
tax, determined through political processes in each country, and generally di¤ering across
countries.
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The initial stock of unextracted carbon is denoted C0 . The Hotelling rule
for the development of p(t) gives us the following two equilibrium conditions:
Z

T

X(p(0)ert ; b) = C0

(5)

0

p(0)erT = b

(6)

Equation (5) tells us that the sum of demand over all periods cannot exceed the available carbon resources, and (6) de…nes T as the time point when
the producer price of carbon reaches the cost of producing the substitute.6
These two equations determine T and p(0), and once these two variables are
determined the whole paths of p and X follow. Obviously, the equilibrium
depends on the value of b.

4

E¤ects of lower costs of producing the substitute

Before giving a formal analysis, it is useful to give a graphical illustration
of the e¤ects of lowering b. In Figure 2, the initial value of b is b0 , with a
corresponding price path p0 (t) and exhaustion date T 0 . Let b be reduced to
b00 , and imagine hypothetically that the date of exhaustion stays constant
at T 0 . If this were the case, the new price path would be p (t). But for
p (t) to be the new equilibrium price path, the carbon resource must be
exhausted exactly at T 0 . Is this possible? Along the path p (t) carbon
demand will di¤er from the demand along the original path p0 (t) for two
reasons: First, it will be higher since the new price path is lower. Second, it
6

If F (w) = 0 for w < ", the demand for carbon will drop to zero when the carbon price
reaches b ". This possibility is consistent with the equilibrium conditions given the way
X( ) is de…ned.
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will be lower since b is lower, and b has a direct e¤ect on carbon demand.
If these two e¤ects are equal, the hypothetical price path p (t) will also be
the actual new equilibrium price path, and the date of exhaustion will be T 0
as before. Obviously, the two e¤ects on demand will generally di¤er. If the
price e¤ect dominates, demand will be higher along p (t) than along p0 (t), so
the resource will be exhausted before T is reached. To restore equilibrium in
this case, the new equilibrium price path p00 (t) must lie above p (t), implying
a new exhaustion date T 00 < T 0 . Conversely, if the direct e¤ect of reduced
b dominates, demand will be lower along p (t) than along p0 (t) , so there
would be carbon resources remaining at T . To restore equilibrium in this
case, the new equilibrium price path p00 (t) must lie below p (t), implying a
new exhaustion date T 00 > T 0 .

4.1

Two special cases

Two special cases illustrate the two possibilities. Consider …rst the case in
which the distribution function F (w) has the property that a share of the
countries have w = 0, while the remaining countries have w > b. In this case
there is no direct e¤ect of b on demand, so that the price e¤ect discussed
above dominates. In this case T must therefore go down when b goes down.
Formally, (5) can in this case be rewritten as
Z

T

D(p(0)ert ) = C0

0

Together with (6), it is clear that a reduction in b must give a reduction
in p(0) and in T .7 This implies that the whole price path is moved down,
and that the path for carbon extraction is shifted up (until the new T ).
This latter e¤ect is illustrated in Figure 3. The extraction path is originally
given by X 0 (t), with the carbon resource being depleted at T 0 . After b is
7

This result is well-known and can be found in most textbooks in resource economics,
see e.g. xxx
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00

reduced the new path is X (t), with the carbon resource being depleted at
00
T . As a consequence of the reduced cost of producing the substitute, some
carbon extraction - and emissions - is thus moved from A to B in Figure 3.
Notice that this result does not depend on the assumed heterogeneity across
countries. If instead all countries had identical and small (or zero) values of
w, we would get the same result: As long as w is su¢ ciently small, there will
be no immediate reduction in demand as b becomes smaller. Therefore the
extraction path must shift upward as illustrated in Figure 3 also in this case.
Consider next the special case in which the demand for carbon plus the
substitute is independent of p. In this case there is no e¤ect from the reduced
price path from p0 (t) to p (t) in Figure 1 on carbon demand. However,
demand goes down as a consequence of b being reduced. In this case the new
equilibrium price path p00 (t) must therefore lie below p (t); giving T 00 > T 0 ,
as illustrated in Figure 4.8 The changed extraction path implies that the
extraction of some carbon has been moved from A to B, i.e. postponed.

4.2

The general case

We now turn to a more formal analysis to see how the exhaustion date T is
a¤ected by a reduction in b: Inserting (6) into (5) gives
Z

T

X(be

r(T t)

; b)dt = C0

(7)

0

which may conveniently be rewritten as
Z

T

X(be

rz

; b)dz = C0

(8)

0

where z denotes time remaining until p reaches its upper limit b. Using
the simpli…ed notation Xp (z) and Xb (z) for Xp (be rz ; b) and Xb (be rz ; b),
8

This Figure illustrates the case of F (0) = 0, so that demand at p = b is zero. If instead
F (0) > 0, i.e. some countries have zero WTP for reduced emissions, the extraction paths
in Figure 4 would jump from positive values to zero at T 0 and T 00 , like in Figure 3.
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straightforward derivations gives the following expression for
dT
=
db

X(be

rT

1

; b)

Z

dT
:
db

T

Xp (z)e

rz

+ Xb (z) dz

(9)

0

De…ne I(z) as
I(z) =

Z

b be

rz

D0 (be

rz

+ w)dF (w)

(10)

0

This expression gives the response of aggregate demand for the countries using carbon to a price change (measured positively). Using (10) and inserting
(4) into (9), we obtain
dT
= X(be
db

rT

; b)

1

Z

T

e

rz

I(z)

(1

e

rz

)Xb (z) dz

(11)

0

The …rst term in square brackets in (11) is positive (except for a limiting
case discussed below), while the second term (including the sign) is negative
(except for a limiting case discussed below). The sign of dT
is thus generally
db
ambiguous.
In the special case illustrated by Figure 3 , demand for carbon was una¤ected by a change in b for all p < b. For this special case we therefore
had Xb = 0, implying that the second term in square brackets was zero. For
> 0, as was previously shown. For
this case it thus follows from (11) that dT
db
the special case illustrated by Figure 4, D0 = 0 for all p < b. For this case
I(z) = 0 for all z, and it follows from (11) that dT
< 0. A decline in b in this
db
case therefore increases T .
We now turn to the general case. We have already shown that if D0 = 0
everywhere, T will increase as a response to a reduction in b. By continuity,
the same must be true for D0 su¢ ciently small. In Appendix II it is formally
shown that for a given level of demand for the substitute for p = b, dT
will
db
be positive if demand (for carbon plus the substitute) is su¢ ciently price
sensitive for p < b. With a su¢ ciently high price sensitivity, T will therefore
12
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go down as b is reduced.
The sign of dT
depends not only on the distribution function F ( ) and
db
the demand function D( ), but also on the amount of unextracted carbon
(C0 ). For a very large value of C0 , T will be very large, implying that the
weight e rz in (11) will be close to zero for most the z-values in the integral
in (11). The second term in this integral will therefore dominate, implying
that dT
< 0. This has a natural interpretation: For a very large unextracted
db
resource stock, the resource rent will be close to zero. There is in this case
not much scope in terms of a reduced resource price as a response to a lower
value of b. In this case the direct a¤ect of reduced b therefore dominates
the aggregate demand response, implying that resource extraction is slowed
down and thus lasts longer.
It follows from the discussion above that the date of resource exhaustion
(T ) may either decline or increase as a consequence of a reduction in b.
It seems reasonable to expect the extraction pro…le to change in a manner
similar to Figure 3 if T is reduced (with or without a discontinuous jump
at the date of exhaustion, cf. footnote 7), and similar to Figure 4 if T is
increased (with or without a discontinuous jump at the date of exhaustion,
cf. footnote 7). However, in Appendix II it is shown that it is possible for
the extraction paths corresponding to two values of b to intersect more than
once. This case seems less likely to occur the stronger the e¤ect b has on T .

4.3

Welfare e¤ects

When the cost of the substitute is reduced, there are three e¤ects on social
welfare. First, there is the direct e¤ect of the reduction of b. The direct
e¤ect of the reduction of b is an increase in social welfare for all countries,
since all countries sooner or later use the substitute. The second e¤ect of
reduced b is that this has an impact on the price path of the carbon resource:
the lower is b, the lower is this price path. I return to this e¤ect below.
13
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Finally, there is the climate e¤ect of the reduction in b: The previous sections
demonstrated that a reduction in the cost of producing a substitute may
either advance or postpone carbon extraction, and thus either contribute
negatively or positively to the overall change in social welfare.
Let p(t) < 0 denote the (small) change in the price path following from
a (small) reduction in b. From the Hotelling Rule we have p(t) = ert p(0).
The value of the resource for the resource owner is p(0)C0 , so the change in
this value is C0 p(0), which is negative.
The welfare level of a single country is
z=

Z

1

e

rt

[u(x(t) + y(t))

p(t)x(t)

by(t)] dt

0

and the change in this welfare level due to the price change is (remembering
that p(t) = ert p(0))

z=

p(0)

Z

1

0

[u (x(t) + y(t))

0

dx(t)
dt
p(t)]
dp(t)

p(0)

Z

1

x(t)dt

(12)

0

Consider …rst the second term in (12). The sum over all countries of the
integral is simply C0 , which implies that the sum of the second term over all
countries is equal to C0 p(0). The sum of this term and the value change
for the resouce owner is thus equal to zero. Moreover, the sum of the …rst
term in (12) over all countries would be equal to zero if all countries had
chosen u0 = p. In this case we would get the well-known result that price
changes have no e¤ect on aggregate welfare, although such price changes
usually a¤ect the distribution of social welfare. However, in our case the
term in square brackets in (12) is equal to w, so that the …rst term in (12) is
equal to
Z 1
dx(t)
w p(0)
dt
(13)
dp(t)
0
which is positive since the derivative in the integral is negative. The overall
14
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welfare e¤ect of the price reduction caused by the reduction in b is therefore
positive.
To conclude so far: Ignoring changes in climate costs, the reduction in b
has an unambiguously positive e¤ect on overall social welfare, although the
owners of the carbon resource have a loss. If resource extraction is postponed, so that climate costs are reduced, this gives an additional increase
in aggregate social welfare. However, if resource extraction is advanced as
a consequence of the reduction in b, climate costs increase. In this case the
there are two positive e¤ects on aggregate social welfare, and one negative.
This negative e¤ect may be so large that it dominates the two positive effects. This will be the case if there is a group of countries with su¢ ciently
high WTP for reduced emissions (and so high that these countries are not
using the carbon resource whatever the value of b). In this case the sum of
the positive terms (13) may be small or zero, since this term is zero for the
countries with the high WTP and x = 0. For su¢ ciently large increases in
climate costs for some countries, these cost increases may be larger than the
direct bene…ts for all countries of the reduction in b.

5

Extensions

The analysis was based on several simplifying assumptions. One of the most
important assumptions was the assumption that there was a perfect substitute for the carbon resource so that there would be no demand for carbon
at prices above b. A second important assumption was that there were no
extraction costs. We shall see that the results derived also hold if these
assumptions are relaxed.

15
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5.1

An imperfect substitute

Carbon resources are used for many purposes, and it is likely to be easier to
…nd good substitutes for some uses than for others. For users of electricity
it makes no di¤erence if the electricity is based on carbon or on alternatives
such as wind, solar or nuclear. The choice between carbon and other energy
sources in this case is thus simply a question of relative costs. A similar
argument can be made for a signi…cant part of other stationary energy uses.
Finding good alternatives for direct use of natural gas in households and
for oil in transportation is likely to be considerable more di¢ cult. Even if
one in the future has a good low-cost primary energy source, energy carriers
such as electric batteries or hydrogen have several disadvantages compared
with oil in the transportation sector. While the use of carbon might be
eliminated as a large-scale stationary energy source in the future when the
price of carbon is su¢ ciently high compared to its substitutes, there is likely
to be continued demand for carbon resources for transportation and for some
small-scale stationary uses even at quite high prices.
For the reasons given above, assume that each country in addition to its
demand D(p + w) has some demand E(p + w) that will not be replaced by
the substitute we are considering, no matter how low b is. Aggregating over
all countries, this additional demand is
Y =

Z

W

E(p + w)dF (w) = Y (p)

(14)

0

With this change, the equilibrium condition in the marked for carbon,
previously given by (7), is changed. It is useful to …rst consider the equilibrium condition that must hold after the date T when the price of carbon
reaches b. In the present case, the carbon price will continue to rise after this
date, and since the equilibrium price cannot jump at T , it must be given by
br(t T ) at any date after T .9 Total resource use after T , denoted CT , must
9

See e.g. Hoel (1984) for a more extensive discussion of market equilibria with this

16
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therefore satisfy the equilibrium condition
Z

1

Y (ber(t

T)

(15)

)dt = CT

T

which de…nes CT as an decreasing function of b.
The equilibrium condition for the period [0; T ] is given by the following
slight modi…cation of (7):
Z

T

Y (be

rz

) + X(be

rz

; b) dz = C0

CT (b)

(16)

0

This equation determines T as a function of b, and we now …nd

dT
=Q
db

CT0 (b)

+

Z

T

e

rz

(I(z) + J(z))

(1

e

rz

)Xb (z) dz

(17)

0

where
Q = Y (be

rT

) + X(be

rT

; b)

1

>0

and J(z) is de…ned similarly to I(z):

J(z) =

Z

W

E 0 (be

rz

+ w)dF (w)

(18)

0

The two new terms CT0 (b) and J(z) are both positive, making dT
> 0 more
db
likely. With an imperfect substitute it thus seems more likely that T will
decline as a consequence of the reduction in b than in the case of a perfect
substitute. Due to continuity (i.e. as Y (p) approaches zero for all p > b),
however, the possibility of dT
< 0 exists also in the present case.
db
type of an imperfect substitute.
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5.2

Extraction costs

Adding a constant unit cost of extraction will not change anything in our
analysis. A more interesting case is when the unit cost of extraction is increasing in accumulated extraction, denoted c(A(t)) where A(t) is accumulated
extraction. If there is an absolute limit on total carbon extraction also in
this case (i:e: A(t) C0 for all t), and this limit is binding, there will be no
signi…cant changes in our analysis (although the producer price development
will be slightly di¤erent from the Hotelling rule of p(t) rising at the rate r).
A more interesting case is when the total amount extracted is determined by
c(A) = b, as illustrated in Figure 5. In this case the resource price will be rising and lie between c(A) and b until p and c(A) reach b (see e.g. Heal (1976)
and Hanson (1980))). The total extraction is determined by the equation
c(A) = b, so that a reduction in b from b0 to b00 will reduce total extraction
from A0 to A00 , see Figure 5. In this case the climate e¤ect of reduced b is
therefore more favorable than in the case treated previously. However, also
in this case it is possible that a reduction in b will give an advancement in
extraction and emissions, and that this may more than outweigh the positive
e¤ect of less total extraction. This is more likely the larger is c0 (A) near
c(A) = b, since a large value of c0 implies that A is only slightly reduced
when b declines. The limiting case of an absolute limit on A is simply that
c0 (A) approaches in…nity.

6

Conclusions

Improved technology, of any kind, is obviously potentially good for a society. When resources are e¢ ciently managed, one can always increase social
welfare if technology is improved. However, with various types of market failures or regulatory failures, social welfare need not necessarily improve with
improved technology. The present paper gives one example of this general
feature. Without good global policies for managing the climate problem,
18

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

17

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 262 [2009]

improved technology of renewable energy may increase climate costs. Moreover, the increased climate costs might even outweigh the direct bene…ts of
the improved technology.
The political implication of this result is not that one should try to slow
down technological progress. However, a belief that technological progress in
itself can help solve the problem of climate change is much too optimistic, to
say the least. Improved technology of various types of renewable energy can
be an important ingredient of mitigating the climate problem, but cannot
be expected to be an alternative to a good international climate agreement
directed directly towards emission reductions. As a supplement to such a
climate agreement, however, improved technology of renewable energy can
play an important role.

Appendix I: Climate costs
Let T (t) be the global average temperature change from some base year to
time t. A standard formulation of the costs of climate change at t is that
~ (t)) where D
~ 0 > 0, and it is often also
these are given by a function D(T
~ 00 > 0: Although I shall use this "standard" formulation, it
assumed that D
is likely to be too simple to capture all concerns about climate change. In
particular, the formulation ignores how fast climate change has occurred.
Moreover, some consequences of climate change will be more or less irreversible and thus remain even if global temperature should decline after a
rise. An obvious example is sea level rise due to melting of ice on Greenland
or parts of Antarctis. Ignoring these complications, the present value of all
costs associated with climate change is at the initial date 0 given by
V0 =

Z

1

e

r

~ ( ))d
D(T

(19)

0

Temperature change depends on the development of the amount of carbon
19
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in the atmosphere. A long-run increase in the amount of carbon from its
preindustrial level S0 to a stationary value S gives the following long-run
increase in temperature (see e.g. xxx):
T =

k
Ln
Ln2

S
S0

where k is the so-called climate sensitivity. If e.g. the stock of carbon rises
to twice its preindustrial level, the temperature will rise by k. According
to IPPC (2007), k is "likely to be in the range 2o C to 4.5o C, with a best
estimate of about 3o C, and very unlikely to be less than 1.5o C".
Actual temperature responds to changes in the atmospheric concentration
with quite a long time lag. Here I model this in the simplest possible way,
namely by assuming a constant time lag ` between S(t) and T (t), implying
T (t) =

k
Ln
Ln2

S(t `)
S0

Inserting this into (19) gives us
V0 =

Z

1

e

r

D(S(

(20)

`))d

0

where
D(S(

~
`)) = D

k
Ln
Ln2

S(

`)
S0

is the climate damage at , following from the amount of carbon in the
atmosphere at
`.
Consider next the climate damage caused by 1 ton of emissions at time t.
I follow Archer (2005) and assume that a share remains in the atmosphere
for ever, where is approximately 0.25. The remaining share 1
gradually
depreciates at a rate : The amount of 1 ton of carbon emissions at time t
remaining in the atmosphere at (> t) is thus + (1
)e ( t) . If e.g.
= 0:013 and = 0:25, 45 % of the original emissions will remain in the
20
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atmosphere after 100 years, while 27 % still remains after 300 years. These
numbers are roughly in line with what is suggested by Archer (2005) and
others.
The total additional damage caused by 1 ton of carbon emissions at time
t is the sum of additional damages at all dates from t + ` to in…nity caused
by the additional stocks from t to in…nity. To get from additional stocks at
to additional damages at + ` we must multiply the additional stocks at
by the marginal damage at + `, which is D0 (S( )). The marginal damage
of 1 additional ton of emissions at t is thus (discounted to 0) given by

v0 (t) = e

r(t+`)

Z

1

e

r(

t)

+ (1

)e

(

t)

D0 (S( ))d

(21)

t

Notice that the time lag between changes in carbon concentration in the
atmosphere and temperature change implies that carbon emissions at t only
start changing the climate at t + `, this is the reason ` occurs in the term in
front of the integral.
The e¤ect of a postponement of carbon extraction on climate damages is
given by the properties of v0 (t). If this function is declining in t, postponement of a given (small) amount of carbon extraction is an advantage in the
sense that it reduces total climate costs (i.e. reduces V0 given by (19)). It
follows from (21) that

v00 (t)

=

e

r(t+`)

0

D (S(t)) + e

r(t+`)

Z

1

(1

) e

t)

(r+ )(

D0 (S( ))d

t

which may be rewritten as

v00 (t)

=

e

r(t+`)

0

D (S(t)) 1

(1

)

Z

t

1

e

(r+ )(

t) D

0

(S( ))

D0 (S(t))

d

(22)
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A postponement in extraction in any period with D0 (S(t)) > 0 will thus give
a reduction in climate costs provided the term in curly brackets is positive.
The second term in curly brackets satis…es

(1

)

Z

1

e

(r+ )(

t

t) D

0

(S( ))
d
0
D (S(t))

(1

D0 (S( ))
) max
D0 (S(t))

Z

1

e

(r+ )(

t)

d

t

or

(1

)

Z

1

e

(r+ )(

t

t) D

(1
)
D0 (S( ))
max
r+
D0 (S(t))

0

(S( ))
d
D0 (S(t))

A su¢ cient condition for the curly brackets in (22) to be positive is therefore that the r.h.s. of the inequality above is smaller than 1. In other words,
when D0 (S(t) > 0; a su¢ cient condition for v00 (t) < 0 is that
max

D0 (S( ))
r+
<
D0 (S(t))
(1
)

(23)

Even if the su¢ cient condition for v0 (t) to be declining does not hold,
it may nevertheless be the case that v00 (t) < 0 for all t. Moreover, even if
v00 (t) < 0 does not hold for all t, a postponement of extraction that shifts the
curve B in Figure 1 towards the right and downwards may nevertheless give
a reduction in climate costs as measured by V0 :
It is useful to consider the special case in which climate costs at any time
are proportional to the stock of carbon in the atmosphere, i.e. D(S) = mS.
In this case it follows from (21) that
v0 (t) = e

r(t+`)

r

+

1
r+

m

which is declining in t. This expression gives the marginal cost at 0 of a unit
of emissions at t. The marginal cost at t of a unit of emissions at t is
22
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vt (t) = e

r`

r

+

1
r+

m

which is constant. One interpretation of the WTP w used in Section 3 and
the subsequent sections is that w simply is vt (t), which varies across countries
if m varies across countries.

Appendix II: The e¤ect of reduced b on the
extraction path
To illustrate the importance of the demand elasticity for the sign of
by (11), consider the class of demand functions
~
D(p) = D(p)
+ k (b

dT
db

given

p)

~ 0 (p) < 0 and k 0. As k increases, demand becomes more sensitive
where D
to price changes, and demand also increases for p < b. With this demand
function it follows from (4), in obvious notation, that
~ + kF (b
I(z) = I(z)

be

rz

)

From this equation it is clear that as k increases, I(z) will also increase.
Moreover, as k increases demand also increases for all p < b, so the total
extraction time T must decline. This means that as k increases, the lowest
weight e rT in (11) increases. Together, these two e¤ects imply that the
integral in the expression for dT
increases as k increases. It follows from this
db
reasoning that dT
must be positive for k su¢ ciently large.
db
In Figures 3 and 4 the extraction path after the decline in b intersects the
initial extraction path only once. However, we cannot rule out the possibility

23

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper262

22

Hoel: Bush Meets Hotelling: Effects of Improved Renewable Energy T

of the two extraction paths intersecting more than once. To see this, consider
the case of dT
= 0. Since T is independent of b in this case, a given value
db
of z corresponds to the same time point independent of b in this case. It
is straightforward to verify that di¤erentiating carbon extraction X(be rz ; b)
with respect to b gives
dX(be rz ; b)
= (1 e rz )Xb (z) e rz I(z)
db
where Xb (z) and I(z) are both positive. Consider this expression for a small
value of z, i.e. at a date close to the date of exhaustion. If D0 (p) is su¢ ciently
close to zero for p 2 [be rz ; b], it follows from (10) that I(z) will be "small"
and thus dX
> 0. If on the other hand F 0 (b be rz ) is su¢ ciently small, it
db
follows from (3) that Xb (z) will be "small" and thus dX
< 0. In other words,
db
at dates just prior to exhaustion extraction may go up or down as a response
to reduced b, even if the exhaustion date is independent of b. By continuity,
the same must be true even if T is a¤ected by the reduction in b: Also in
this case extraction may go up or down at a particular date as a response
to b declining, independently of which direction T moves when b goes down.
This proves the possibility of extraction paths for two values of b intersecting
more than once.
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Figure 3

Figure 4
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